네오콘의 대표적 인사인
WILLIAM KRISTOL과 GARY SCHMITT가 12월 2일쓴
"A Dangerous New Policy Toward Taiwan?"을 읽어 보니
네오콘이 대만 문제 때문에
부시 정부에게 단단히 화가 나 있는 걸 볼 수 있네요.
다들 기억하지요. 얼마전 원자바오가 미국 갔을 때
부시가 대만 보고 "니들, 대만 독립에 대한 국민 투표 하지마"하고
선언했던 일 말이예요.
네오콘에 따르면 부시의 이러한 반대만적 발언을 주도한 것은
James Moriarty(the senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council)과
Doug Paal(the de facto U.S. ambassador to Taiwan) 라고 합니다.
그리고 이 문제에 대해 국무부와 국방부는 반대했지만
이를 무릅쓰고 미국 NSC에 있는 이들이 주도해서
반대만적 정책을 펼치고 있다는군요.
그러면서 부시가 앞으로 더 친중적인 정책
즉 "대만이 중국을 자극하는 행동을 하여
중국이 대만을 침공하더라도 미국이 개입하지 않겠다"는
선언을 하는 것은 위의 사람들이 추진하고 있다고 분석하는군요.
사실 부시는 이 친중 발언을 하기 며칠 전에
NED에서 세계 민주주의 혁명이라는
엄청나게 감동적인 연설을 했었죠.
이 직후에 나온 친중 발언이기 때문에
네오콘들은 더더욱 흥분하고 있는 것 같습니다.
즉 어떻게 독재 국가인 중국 편에 서서
민주주의 국가인 대만을 희생하는 발언 또는
정책을 펼 수 있느냐는 것이지요.
그 전에 미국이 대만을 중국에 양보하는 대신
중국이 김정일을 제거하는 것을 합의해주는 시나리오를
본 적이 있는데
그런 맥락에서 부시의 친중 전환을 이해해야 할까요?
굉장히 주목해 보아야 할 부분인 것 같습니다.
아무튼 이번 부시의 친중 발언을 통해
확실히 드러난 것은
미국의 외교 정책이 네오콘에 의해
완전히 장악되어 있지 않다는 사실과
미 행정부 내에서도
중국-대만 문제에 있어서
다양한 입장 차이가 있다는 사실입니다.
참고로 원문을 첨부합니다.
WILLIAM KRISTOL & GARY SCHMITT
SUBJECT: A Dangerous New Policy Toward Taiwan?
Senior Bush Administration officials may be engineering a dramatic and dangerous shift in American policy toward Taiwan as a gift to the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, who is visiting the United States next week. There are two elements of this proposed policy change, both of which favor Beijing at the expense of democratic Taiwan, and one of which may actually encourage Beijing to take military action against Taiwan. Both policy changes are being pushed by the staff of the National Security Council over the objections, we understand, of both the Departments of State and Defense.
First, according to numerous government sources, the senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council, James Moriarty, and Doug Paal, the de facto U.S. ambassador to Taiwan, are urging President Bush to declare, privately and perhaps publicly, that the United States opposes Taiwan's independence. This would be a significant change in America's so-called "One-China Policy," a change very much in Beijing's favor.
Until now, the American position on Taiwan's independence has been agnostic. American presidents have said they do not support independence but have also insisted that the cross-Strait issue be settled peacefully and by common agreement of the two sides. The point was that no solution should be imposed on either side. It was also to leave open the possibility that both sides might agree on independence, as indeed might occur were mainland China ever to become democratic (just as Moscow let go of Ukraine after the fall of communism in Russia). If the Bush Administration changes its policy, it will place the United States in opposition to Taiwanese independence even under that scenario. Above all, however, if the administration makes this change, it will strike a severe blow against the vibrant Taiwanese democracy in a kow-tow to Beijing. After the President's recent stirring remarks in favor of democracy worldwide, this move against Taiwan's democracy would be a shameful betrayal of what seemed to be the President's core principle in foreign policy.
Moriarty's second proposal is even more worrying. He proposes the United States declare that it will not defend Taiwan if Beijing launches a military attack on the island in response to a "provocation," i.e., some action or statement by Taiwan that Beijing determines moves in the direction of independence. This proposal, if adopted by the administration, could prove disastrous on several grounds. First of all, it would appear to run counter to the Taiwan Relations Act passed by Congress in 1979. Indeed, it may constitute an effort by the Bush administration in effect to repeal that law by executive fiat. The Act makes it U.S. policy that there should be a peaceful resolution of the dispute between China and Taiwan. But, by suggesting that there may be "legitimate" grounds for China to take offense, this new declaration would condone the very action the law intends to prevent. This would be all the more remarkable given that less than two years ago President Bush reaffirmed the American commitment to Taiwan by declaring that the United States would do "whatever it took" to defend Taiwan.
Second, this proposed policy shift would make war in the Strait more likely, not less. If the United States tells Beijing that it will not defend Taiwan in the event of a "provocation," this can only serve as an inducement to Beijing to threaten to use force, or perhaps actually to use force, on any occasion that Beijing deems Taiwan's behavior "provocative." After all, what constitutes a "provocation"? Beijing believes Taiwan's current status of de facto independence is already unacceptable.
Of course, the reason behind the latest maneuverings within the Bush Administration is the recent decision by the present government of Taiwan to hold national referenda on a variety of issues this spring. Beijing fears that Taiwan may eventually decide to hold a referendum on subjects pertaining to independence. China has therefore denounced all referenda on any subject as "provocative." They have even warned darkly of possible "consequences" should Taiwan go ahead with the referenda. In addition, senior Chinese officials have repeatedly demanded that the Bush Administration use American pressure to force Taiwan to abandon all referendum plans.
It appears that the Bush Administration has at least partly caved to Beijing's pressure. Moriarty recently traveled to Taipei to deliver a stern warning against holding any referendum on any subject. Now he wants the administration to offer assurances to Premier Wen that the United States will indeed oppose referenda in Taiwan. This means, in turn, that the administration will effectively be agreeing with Beijing that such referenda constitute a "provocation." So what happens when Taiwan goes ahead and holds its referendum this spring, as it surely will?
We hope the Bush Administration will pull back from this catastrophic change of course. The Clinton Administration bent to China on the issue of Taiwan as well, but never as dangerously as senior Bush Administration officials are now proposing. Nor so immorally. Taiwan is a thriving democracy. The Beijing government remains a tyranny. Will the Bush administration stifle democracy in Taiwan -- actually demanding that it not hold popular votes -- to curry favor with the dictatorship?
WILLIAM KRISTOL과 GARY SCHMITT가 12월 2일쓴
"A Dangerous New Policy Toward Taiwan?"을 읽어 보니
네오콘이 대만 문제 때문에
부시 정부에게 단단히 화가 나 있는 걸 볼 수 있네요.
다들 기억하지요. 얼마전 원자바오가 미국 갔을 때
부시가 대만 보고 "니들, 대만 독립에 대한 국민 투표 하지마"하고
선언했던 일 말이예요.
네오콘에 따르면 부시의 이러한 반대만적 발언을 주도한 것은
James Moriarty(the senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council)과
Doug Paal(the de facto U.S. ambassador to Taiwan) 라고 합니다.
그리고 이 문제에 대해 국무부와 국방부는 반대했지만
이를 무릅쓰고 미국 NSC에 있는 이들이 주도해서
반대만적 정책을 펼치고 있다는군요.
그러면서 부시가 앞으로 더 친중적인 정책
즉 "대만이 중국을 자극하는 행동을 하여
중국이 대만을 침공하더라도 미국이 개입하지 않겠다"는
선언을 하는 것은 위의 사람들이 추진하고 있다고 분석하는군요.
사실 부시는 이 친중 발언을 하기 며칠 전에
NED에서 세계 민주주의 혁명이라는
엄청나게 감동적인 연설을 했었죠.
이 직후에 나온 친중 발언이기 때문에
네오콘들은 더더욱 흥분하고 있는 것 같습니다.
즉 어떻게 독재 국가인 중국 편에 서서
민주주의 국가인 대만을 희생하는 발언 또는
정책을 펼 수 있느냐는 것이지요.
그 전에 미국이 대만을 중국에 양보하는 대신
중국이 김정일을 제거하는 것을 합의해주는 시나리오를
본 적이 있는데
그런 맥락에서 부시의 친중 전환을 이해해야 할까요?
굉장히 주목해 보아야 할 부분인 것 같습니다.
아무튼 이번 부시의 친중 발언을 통해
확실히 드러난 것은
미국의 외교 정책이 네오콘에 의해
완전히 장악되어 있지 않다는 사실과
미 행정부 내에서도
중국-대만 문제에 있어서
다양한 입장 차이가 있다는 사실입니다.
참고로 원문을 첨부합니다.
WILLIAM KRISTOL & GARY SCHMITT
SUBJECT: A Dangerous New Policy Toward Taiwan?
Senior Bush Administration officials may be engineering a dramatic and dangerous shift in American policy toward Taiwan as a gift to the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, who is visiting the United States next week. There are two elements of this proposed policy change, both of which favor Beijing at the expense of democratic Taiwan, and one of which may actually encourage Beijing to take military action against Taiwan. Both policy changes are being pushed by the staff of the National Security Council over the objections, we understand, of both the Departments of State and Defense.
First, according to numerous government sources, the senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council, James Moriarty, and Doug Paal, the de facto U.S. ambassador to Taiwan, are urging President Bush to declare, privately and perhaps publicly, that the United States opposes Taiwan's independence. This would be a significant change in America's so-called "One-China Policy," a change very much in Beijing's favor.
Until now, the American position on Taiwan's independence has been agnostic. American presidents have said they do not support independence but have also insisted that the cross-Strait issue be settled peacefully and by common agreement of the two sides. The point was that no solution should be imposed on either side. It was also to leave open the possibility that both sides might agree on independence, as indeed might occur were mainland China ever to become democratic (just as Moscow let go of Ukraine after the fall of communism in Russia). If the Bush Administration changes its policy, it will place the United States in opposition to Taiwanese independence even under that scenario. Above all, however, if the administration makes this change, it will strike a severe blow against the vibrant Taiwanese democracy in a kow-tow to Beijing. After the President's recent stirring remarks in favor of democracy worldwide, this move against Taiwan's democracy would be a shameful betrayal of what seemed to be the President's core principle in foreign policy.
Moriarty's second proposal is even more worrying. He proposes the United States declare that it will not defend Taiwan if Beijing launches a military attack on the island in response to a "provocation," i.e., some action or statement by Taiwan that Beijing determines moves in the direction of independence. This proposal, if adopted by the administration, could prove disastrous on several grounds. First of all, it would appear to run counter to the Taiwan Relations Act passed by Congress in 1979. Indeed, it may constitute an effort by the Bush administration in effect to repeal that law by executive fiat. The Act makes it U.S. policy that there should be a peaceful resolution of the dispute between China and Taiwan. But, by suggesting that there may be "legitimate" grounds for China to take offense, this new declaration would condone the very action the law intends to prevent. This would be all the more remarkable given that less than two years ago President Bush reaffirmed the American commitment to Taiwan by declaring that the United States would do "whatever it took" to defend Taiwan.
Second, this proposed policy shift would make war in the Strait more likely, not less. If the United States tells Beijing that it will not defend Taiwan in the event of a "provocation," this can only serve as an inducement to Beijing to threaten to use force, or perhaps actually to use force, on any occasion that Beijing deems Taiwan's behavior "provocative." After all, what constitutes a "provocation"? Beijing believes Taiwan's current status of de facto independence is already unacceptable.
Of course, the reason behind the latest maneuverings within the Bush Administration is the recent decision by the present government of Taiwan to hold national referenda on a variety of issues this spring. Beijing fears that Taiwan may eventually decide to hold a referendum on subjects pertaining to independence. China has therefore denounced all referenda on any subject as "provocative." They have even warned darkly of possible "consequences" should Taiwan go ahead with the referenda. In addition, senior Chinese officials have repeatedly demanded that the Bush Administration use American pressure to force Taiwan to abandon all referendum plans.
It appears that the Bush Administration has at least partly caved to Beijing's pressure. Moriarty recently traveled to Taipei to deliver a stern warning against holding any referendum on any subject. Now he wants the administration to offer assurances to Premier Wen that the United States will indeed oppose referenda in Taiwan. This means, in turn, that the administration will effectively be agreeing with Beijing that such referenda constitute a "provocation." So what happens when Taiwan goes ahead and holds its referendum this spring, as it surely will?
We hope the Bush Administration will pull back from this catastrophic change of course. The Clinton Administration bent to China on the issue of Taiwan as well, but never as dangerously as senior Bush Administration officials are now proposing. Nor so immorally. Taiwan is a thriving democracy. The Beijing government remains a tyranny. Will the Bush administration stifle democracy in Taiwan -- actually demanding that it not hold popular votes -- to curry favor with the dictatorship?